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O ne prominent feature of virtually every developing country is an enor-mous divide between rural and urban living standards, measured by income, consumption, or various nonmonetary aspects of life. As a result, 
much of the inequality within the developing world—home to about half of the 
planet’s nearly 8 billion people—is accounted for by the urban-rural gap. 
To illustrate, Table 1 presents a number of comparisons of rural and urban 
living standards for those residing in Nigeria and India—the most populous coun-
tries in Africa and South Asia, respectively—drawing on real outcomes measured 
from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). In Nigerian and Indian villages, 
the floor in your home would most likely be made of dirt; in urban areas, floors are 
most commonly made of wood or stone. About one-half of rural Indians and one-
third of rural Nigerians have no toilet facility of any kind—not even a pit latrine or 
composting toilet—while virtually all urban residents have one, however rudimen-
tary. Fewer than four in ten rural Nigerians can point to a power outlet inside their 
home, compared with eight out of ten urbanites. Rural Indians similarly lag behind 
their urban counterparts in electricity connections. In both countries, television 
ownership rates in cities are about twice as high as in rural areas. 
Similar patterns emerge when looking at mortality rates and other health 
metrics. In both Nigeria and India, you would be just over half as likely to perish 
before your fifth birthday in a city than in a village. Among adults, a body-mass index 
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of less than 18.5 is a commonly used indicator of serious malnutrition. For example, 
someone who is 5' 8" tall (172 centimeters) would have to weigh just 122 pounds 
(55 kilograms) to have a BMI of 18.5. In both countries your chance of having such 
a low BMI would be about 50 percent higher in rural areas than in cities. 
Of course, well-being depends on a host of other factors other than the few 
presented here, and some of these are harder to measure. A full accounting of 
urban-rural differences might also take into consideration the value (positive or 
negative) placed on the hustle and bustle of urban centers or the security of tradi-
tional kinship ties in rural villages. However, the observable differences are so large 
that it is hard to believe that rural-urban gaps are simply artifacts of inaccurate 
measurement. The real issue is how to interpret these gaps and whether policy 
should try to do anything about them.
In this essay, I first set the stage by offering some more systematic evidence on 
the size and prevalence of the urban-rural gap from a variety of recent data sources. 
I then discuss whether the urban-rural gap can be explained by sorting; after all, it 
is clearly the case that those in urban areas tend to have more education, and they 
are probably selected on other less observable abilities as well. In addition, I review 
an array of evidence on outcomes of worker migration and find that rural-to-urban 
migrants do typically obtain higher incomes, which suggests that the pre-migration 
Table 1 
Real Urban and Rural Living Standards in India and Nigeria
Urban Rural
Percent with finished floors
India: 70.4 40.3
Nigeria: 88.1 60.8






Percent owning a television
India: 87.0 53.5
Nigeria: 70.7 30.0
Under-five mortality (per 1,000 births)
India: 36 59
Nigeria: 86 155
Percent with BMI below 18.5
India: 15.5 26.8
Nigeria: 9.6 14.4
Note: Compiled from the Demographic and Health Surveys, funded by the 
US Association for International Development and publicly available at 
https://dhsprogram.com/. The statistics are calculated in the most recent 
year available, which is most commonly 2018.
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situation cannot entirely be due to efficient sorting by skill and education. In addi-
tion, while rural-to-urban migrants do experience gains, migration itself does not 
close the urban-rural gap. Thus, I turn to other potential explanations. I emphasize 
that a variety of frictions—information, financial, and in land markets—may help 
to explain the persistence of urban-rural gaps, though much more work is needed 
here.1 
Throughout time and space, economic development has been associated with 
massive population movements from rural to urban areas, and from agriculture 
to non-agricultural activities. A main reason urban-rural gaps are worthy of study 
is that it they may be informative about this process of structural transformation. 
Some writers have pointed to the large urban-rural gaps as suggesting the possibility 
of massive productivity gains from helping move workers in developing countries 
out of rural agriculture (Caselli 2005; Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu 2008; Vollrath 2009; 
McMillan, Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo 2014). I offer a more restrained conclusion. 
Although some rural-to-urban migrants already make gains, many choose not to 
migrate for a variety of reasons. Some of these reasons may be efficient in the sense 
that a benevolent social planner wouldn’t want them to do any differently. However, 
others may be held back inefficiently from rural-to-urban migration, and policy may 
play an important role in reducing the frictions that keep them from the higher 
living standards that cities would offer them.
Urban-Rural Gaps: Recent Systematic Evidence
Until recently, most of the evidence on urban-rural gaps has come from 
nominal income or consumption expenditure data by region that has been deflated 
using spatial price indices. However, price deflation is never quite as straightforward 
as the breezy descriptions that we (or at least I) offer in undergraduate macroeco-
nomics lectures. The main challenge is that many goods and services are not that 
easy to compare between cities and rural villages. For example, an urban apartment 
will carry a higher monthly rent than a straw hut of comparable size in a remote 
area, but will involve a number of quality differences including access to electricity 
and running water. This makes apples-to-apples comparisons difficult. Prices for 
food items are also tricky to compare, because such a large fraction of food in rural 
areas is home-produced (Deaton and Dupriez 2011). 
Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2007) construct arguably the best rural-urban 
price deflators available for a large set of low-income countries, drawing on spatial 
1 For engaging overviews of urban economics in the developing world, the interested reader might begin 
with the review articles by Bryan, Glaeser, and Tsivanidis (2019) and Brueckner and Lall (2015) and the 
book by Glaeser (2017), which helps put today’s developing-world cities in a broader historical context. 
While rural-urban migration will be discussed below, I will focus mostly on how it informs us about the 
sources of the urban-rural gaps. For a more general review of the literature on rural-urban migration, 
a useful starting point is the article by Lucas (2015). Similarly, for more on the role of migration and 
rural-urban gaps in dual economy models in economics, the essay by Gollin (2014) is essential reading.
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price data collected by the World Bank. On average, they find that the “same basket,” 
to the extent that such a thing can be measured, costs around 30 percent more in 
cities than in rural areas. They argue that these price differentials are not nearly 
enough to offset the higher poverty rates of rural areas that are implied by nominal 
consumption expenditures. This finding of higher real poverty rates in rural areas 
is echoed in the work of Ferré, Ferreira, and Lanjouw (2012), among many others, 
all of whom grapple with similar challenges in making spatial price adjustments. 
The pioneering paper by Young (2013) offers an alternative approach to 
measuring real rural-urban consumption gaps in the developing world that side-
steps the need for spatial price indices. The methodology he develops, while less 
transparent than approaches based on regional price deflation, allows him to esti-
mate a single proxy for “consumption” per head in rural and urban areas of 67 
developing countries using the data from the Demographic and Health Surveys 
discussed above. The idea is to infer household consumption levels using cross-
sectional correlations between educational attainment and the consumption of 
each “good” measured in the data (Young 2012, 2013). The “goods” are actually 
23 real outcomes, including ownership of durable goods (like televisions), housing 
conditions (like access to electricity), and children’s health outcomes. Thus, Young’s 
measure of consumption is broader in some ways than typical national accounts 
measures of consumption, but it covers a narrower set of goods. Across Young’s 
(2013) set of developing countries, average consumption per household is 4.5 times 
as high in urban areas as in rural areas. In addition, Young calculates that 40 percent 
of total inequality is accounted for by the urban-rural gaps themselves. The share 
of inequality explained by the urban-rural gap is higher in countries with more 
inequality. For example, in Zimbabwe, one of most unequal countries in Young’s 
data, the urban-rural gap explains close to 70 percent of all inequality.
The urban-rural gaps in consumption and income are related—though clearly 
not identical—to the gaps in income per head between agricultural and non-
agricultural workers. Researchers who focus on agricultural and non-agricultural 
incomes can make use of national accounts data on value-added by sector, which is 
widely available. Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014) draw on sectoral value added 
data for 151 counties (of all income levels) and construct employment by sector 
using nationally representative surveys. On average, they find that value added per 
worker is 3.5 times as high in the non-agricultural sector as in agriculture. This ratio 
is well above one in all but a handful of countries in their data.
One key concern with sector-level national accounts data is that while the 
guidelines behind the UN Systems of National Accounts clearly include non-market 
production of goods (including agricultural goods) as part of value added, in prac-
tice such output may be underestimated, as Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2004) 
hypothesize. Indeed, Herrendorf and Schoellman (2015) document this pattern in 
US agricultural output data. Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014) seek to address this 
issue by constructing value added using household income and consumption data 
for ten countries from the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Surveys 
(LSMS), which contain detailed questions about agricultural production both 
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for own consumption or to be sold in a market. Such measures continue to show 
large gaps in value added per worker between agricultural and non-agricultural 
workers. For example, the urban-rural gap in Ghana is 2.2 according to the national 
income accounts and 2.3 using the household surveys. Cote d’Ivoire has a gap of 
4.7 according to the national income accounts and 4 using the household surveys. 
These multiples are not identical, to be sure, but recalculating based on household 
survey data continues to leave a large gap. 
To circumvent the national accounts data altogether, Herrendorf and 
Schoellman (2018) focus on wage data by sector, where wages are defined as labor 
income divided by hours worked. Their data come from nationally representa-
tive population censuses compiled by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS). On average, the simple ratio of non-agricultural average wages to agricul-
tural average is around 1.8 in the 13 countries they study, with a range of 1.5 to 2.7, 
and gaps of a similar magnitude when splitting non-agriculture into industry and 
services. These gaps are not as large as some calculated by other methods, but in 
none of their countries does a simple comparison of average wages yield anything 
close to parity between the agriculture and non-agricultural sectors.
How do the urban-rural gaps in developing countries compare to those of high-
income countries? The limited available evidence points in the direction of larger 
gaps in developing countries, but this evidence is far from definitive. Drawing on 
rich regional-level data, Chauvin et al. (2017) document that in China and India, a 
doubling of population density is associated with an increase in average real wages 
of around 6 percent. In other words, more urbanized regions offer substantial wage 
premia relative to more rural areas. In the United States, a doubling of density leads 
real wages to increase by only about 2 percent, consistent with a smaller urban-rural 
divide. On the other hand, in Brazil, the wage-density gradient is even smaller at 
around 1 percent. Looking at agricultural productivity gaps, Gollin, Lagakos, and 
Waugh (2014) find that the median gap is 4.3 among countries in the bottom quar-
tile of the world income distribution, compared to 1.7 in the top quartile, while 
the mean gap is 5.6 in the bottom quartile and 2.0 in the top quartile. Thus, these 
gaps are substantially larger on average in poorer countries. Still, there is a lot of 
variation within each income quartile, and many high-income countries exhibit very 
large gaps as well. 
A related question is whether urban-rural gaps tend to decrease over time as 
economies develop and populations urbanize. While many economists have the 
prior that they do, the historical evidence is thin and some studies have pointed 
to quite different patterns. For example, Hatton and Williamson (1992) show that 
the rural-urban gap actually widened in the United States from the late nineteenth 
century up until right before World War II, and Lundh and Prado (2015) find that 
the gap in Sweden changed very little over the twentieth century. Hnatkovska and 
Lahiri (2018) document that, since the 1980s, urban-rural wage gaps have widened 
in China and decreased substantially in India. A valuable task for future research 
would be to look systematically at how these gaps have evolved over long time hori-
zons in a broad set of countries. 
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Sorting and Evidence from Internal Migrants 
Urban households differ from rural households in many ways: they perform 
different jobs, possess different skills, and as one would expect, receive different 
compensation levels. To what extent can the urban-rural gaps in average incomes 
be explained by a situation with more productive individuals sorting into cities and 
less productive types ending up mostly in rural areas? Suppose, for argument’s sake, 
that the answer is 100 percent. Then there would be a sense in which the urban-
rural gap would not be policy relevant. In the same way that dentists earn more on 
average than Uber drivers, urbanites may just be different people from villagers. We 
should not then be trying to turn villagers into urbanites any more than we should 
be encouraging Uber drivers to earn their living filling cavities.
In this section, I first discuss some models and quantitative analyses of sorting 
and then turn to evidence from long-term panel data and experimental studies of 
internal migration. The theory of sorting makes a strong case that the gains from 
expanding rural-to-urban migration will be much smaller than a naïve interpre-
tation of the urban-rural gap might suggest because average levels of education 
and skill are lower in rural areas. However, I will also argue that the reduced-form 
evidence on sorting can be hard to interpret because these data mix together 
migrants with many varying motivations for migration—for example, the fact that 
some migrants are choosing a move toward opportunity while others are making 
a forced move of necessity—and do not take into account the many varying moti-
vations for non-migration. Overall, sorting alone does not seem to explain the 
ongoing urban-rural gaps in income and standard of living, though it certainly 
explains part of it. 
A Sorting Approach to Urban-Rural Gaps
At least in cross-sectional data, the signs that there is urban-rural sorting based 
on observable variables like education are overwhelming. As one example, Gollin, 
Lagakos, and Waugh (2014) measure average years of schooling among non- 
agricultural and agricultural workers in 124 countries using census data from IPUMS 
and household survey data from various other sources. In literally every country, 
non-agricultural workers have higher average schooling levels, and on average, they 
have almost twice as many years of schooling than those working in agriculture. The 
same basic finding shows up in every other cross-sectional comparison of which I am 
aware, whether looking at non-agriculture versus agriculture or urban versus rural. 
Taking a historical perspective, Porzio and Santangelo (2019) argue that the rise of 
schooling globally over the twentieth century was one of the main factors behind 
the large movement of workers into the non-agricultural sector observed in most 
countries over this period.
Taking this a step further, Young (2013) looks not only at where workers are 
currently located, but where they were raised as children. He finds that rural-to-
urban migrants have substantially higher education levels than those who were 
raised in rural areas and stayed there. Urban-to-rural migrants, in contrast, have 
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much lower education levels than those born in urban areas who remained there. 
His data cover 170 surveys from a diverse set of developing countries, and thus 
emphasize that sorting on education is a basic fact of life in the developing world. 
Theoretical models have been built on this insight; for example, the Lucas (2004) 
model of rural-urban migration and long-run economic growth begins with the 
premise that education is valuable only in urban areas.
However, the obvious question is the importance of this sorting in accounting 
for the urban-rural gaps, and here the literature remains divided to some extent. 
For example, Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014) take a basic approach and convert 
years of schooling into “units of human capital” using an off-the-shelf estimate of 
10 percent (Mincerian) return to a year of schooling. Their approach follows the 
literature on development accounting that does more or less the same thing but in 
a cross-country setting (for example, see Hsieh and Klenow 2010). The resulting 
human capital stocks estimated by Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014) are around 
40 percent higher for non-agricultural workers, which explains only a modest frac-
tion of the overall gaps. Country-specific returns and attempts to adjust for schooling 
quality explain a bit more, but still leave large residual gaps.
Herrendorf and Schoellman (2018) draw on their individual-level wage data 
to estimate the Mincerian returns to education and experience by sector for their 
set of 13 countries. They find smaller returns to education among agricultural 
workers than for workers in other sectors, which squares with the common percep-
tion that education is not that useful in farming. Once they add controls, including 
for education, they find that the raw wage gaps of 1.8 in the median country fall to 
1.3. Vollrath (2014) takes a similar approach but by using data from the Living Stan-
dards Measurement Surveys for 14 developing countries. His approach includes 
controls for age and age-squared (to capture experience effects), occupation, and, 
in one specification, occupation-specific returns to education. His extra controls get 
the gaps to fall further, though his estimated wages are still lower in agriculture even 
with the most stringent set of controls.
Of course, economists are fully aware that the measurable variable of educa-
tion is likely to be highly correlated with a number of unobservable variables, like 
cognitive abilities or whether a family offers support for education. Furthermore, 
the importance of sorting is likely to be more important among educated workers 
than for those performing unskilled manual tasks, among which skill heterogeneity 
is probably not that substantial. When developing a model for putting education in 
the context of a broader group of observed and unobservable variables, one sooner 
or later arrives at the Roy (1951) model of occupational choice. In brief, the Roy 
model posits that each worker has a vector of “skills”—one for each occupation—
rather than a single skill level. Workers then sort into the occupation that yields 
them the highest income level. 
The most difficult challenge with Roy-style models of sorting is that one rarely 
observes the paths not chosen—that is, the life that rural-urban migrants would 
have led had they stayed in the village. One approach, first taken in this literature 
by Lagakos and Waugh (2013), is to draw on more structure to make inferences, 
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using parameterized versions of the Roy model calibrated to data on wage distri-
butions by sector. The papers of Young (2013) and Herrendorf and Schoellman 
(2018) introduce richer Roy models that combine sorting on observables, in partic-
ular, education as well as unobservable ability. The key theme in these models is 
that the urban sector is more skill-intensive. Workers are endowed with education, 
but education is not a skill in and of itself and only increases the probability of 
becoming skilled. Those becoming skilled stay and work in the skill-intensive urban 
sector. Those born in the rural area but who become skilled—even with their lower 
education level—migrate to the city to work in the urban sector. The reverse is true 
for those not becoming skilled, who find their way to the rural area to work in the 
unskilled-intensive sector. 
The theory is consistent with the clear sorting on education by region in the 
data, with the more educated primarily locating in cities. Because education and 
ability are positively correlated, those with higher ability are also primarily located 
in cities. In the models presented in these papers, the higher average education and 
ability of workers in cities combine quantitatively to account for nearly all of the 
urban-rural gap, leaving little or no role for any other explanatory factor.
Compelling as these models may be, there is only so far one can go with sorting 
stories by looking at cross-sectional data, with one wage outcome per individual 
(Heckman and Honore 1990). What is more informative, though still no panacea, is 
to draw on detailed panel data to observe what actually happens to those that move 
between rural and urban areas.
Panel Data on Internal Migration
Hicks et al. (2017) carry out such an exercise using two long and large house-
hold panel surveys: the Indonesian Family Life Survey and the Kenyan Life Panel 
Survey. What makes these surveys so attractive, besides their length and large sample 
sizes, is that they make a serious effort to track every respondent that moves between 
survey waves. Such tracking is not easy: many migrants leave behind little trace of 
their whereabouts, requiring survey enumerators to do some real detective work. 
The punchline of their study is that the gaps between urban and rural areas 
are far larger than the changes in income and consumption experienced by those 
moving from rural to urban areas (or from agriculture into a non-agricultural job). 
In Indonesia, for example, the urban-rural earnings gap is about 1.7 when calcu-
lated without any other controls—roughly in line with the cross-sectional estimates 
described above. But once individual fixed effects are included, the urban coeffi-
cient falls nearly to zero. In Kenya, the cross-sectional urban-rural gap in earnings 
is around 2.4 without any controls, but this falls by two-thirds with individual fixed 
effects. The results for non-agricultural worker status yield different numbers but 
the same conclusion: cross-sectional gaps are cut down dramatically once individual 
fixed effects are added to the regressions.2
2 Hicks et al. (2017) find that cognitive ability scores, measured using Raven’s Progressive Matrices, are 
around 0.3 standard deviations higher in both countries among migrants than for those who remain 
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More recent evidence from other studies and from countries other than Indo-
nesia and Kenya has tended to find similar patterns; that is, the observed gains from 
rural-to-urban migration are much smaller than urban-rural cross-sectional gaps. 
Using detailed wage data from a large survey in Brazil, Alvarez (2020) finds that 
sectoral movers gain a lot less than one would naively expect given the large cross-
sectional wage gap in Brazil. Non-agricultural workers in the cross-section earn a 
premium of around 62 percent relative to agricultural workers. Once individual 
fixed effects are included, the premium is a just 9 percent for manufacturing and 
a paltry 4 percent for services. He concludes that sorting on observables explains 
close to the entire Brazilian cross-sectional gap.
Lagakos et al. (forthcoming) follow suit by looking at the returns to migration 
for rural-urban migrants in China, Ghana, Indonesia, Malawi, South Africa, and 
Tanzania. The surveys they draw on are nationally representative panels and also 
make substantial efforts to track migrants across space. Like Hicks et al. (2017) 
and Alvarez (2020), these panel data confirm the substantially smaller returns to 
rural-urban migration for those choosing to migrate than the cross-sectional gaps. 
However, their estimated returns are not near-zero after controls for individual 
fixed effects, and instead, average a substantial 25 percent across their countries. 
Lagakos et al. (forthcoming) show that their larger average estimated returns come 
from their different set of countries, not differences in methodology. Their esti-
mated return for Indonesia, also studied by Hicks et al., is the smallest of their six 
countries. 
There are other earlier studies from developing countries that estimate the 
gains from migrating from urban to rural areas, though these tend to have smaller 
sample sizes and not to be nationally representative. These earlier studies have 
generally found substantial returns to migration for those observed to migrate. 
For example, in a study of 772 rural Indian individuals that were surveyed in 1975 
and again in 2005, Dercon, Krishnan, and Krutikova (2013) find consumption 
per capita was 42 percent higher for those that migrated since the first survey 
than for those that stayed put. Using panel tracking data from northern Tanzania, 
Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2011) find that among 912 households surveyed, 
those moving out of the community had 36 percent higher consumption levels 
than those that remained behind after controlling for education, age, and other 
co-variates. Individuals that moved further away tended to have larger consump-
tion gains.
in rural areas. They cite this, convincingly, as direct evidence that rural-urban migrants are positively 
selected on ability, in addition to education. While the topic of international migration is beyond the 
scope of the current essay, it is worth pointing out that the literature on international migration has also 
found strong evidence of positive selection into migration, both on observables and unobservables. For 
example, McKenzie, Stillman, and Gibson (2010) provide experimental evidence that the large wage 
gains for Tongan migrants to New Zealand are largely due to selection on who chooses to apply for 
a migration lottery. For the much larger set of Mexican migrants to the United States, Chiquiar and 
Hanson (2005) document strong positive selection on education relative to Mexican non-migrants.
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Difficulties in Interpreting Observational Returns to Migration
One might be tempted to conclude that because the gains from migration are 
substantially smaller than the cross-sectional gaps, there is little scope for policy 
aimed at encouraging rural-urban migration. Yet this conclusion should be prof-
fered with some skepticism. The “observational returns to migration” estimated 
from non-experimental panel data require some care to interpret and do not trans-
late as easily as one might think into lessons about the effects of incentivizing others 
to migrate internally. In general, the concerns relate to the non-random nature of 
who migrates and to the fact that many people do not actually migrate.
First, worker heterogeneity may extend to migration costs, not just to the 
migration benefits (as posited in most Roy-style models). Individuals who migrate 
in equilibrium may be those with relatively low costs and low benefits of migrating, 
as might be the case for one whose village is close to a major urban center and 
connected to it by a high quality road. Conversely, those who do not migrate because 
of high costs—even if they might also experience large potential gains—will never 
help identify the urban coefficient in a regression that relies only on migrants for 
identification (Lagakos et al. forthcoming). There is clearly more work to be done 
to improve our understanding of how migration costs differ across individuals, as 
opposed to just the returns to migration.
Second, migrating workers who switch sectors may do so for reasons other than 
choosing the best sector for themselves in a permanent sense. This possibility is 
consistent with the findings of Pulido and Święcki (2018) who, using the same Indo-
nesian panel data as Hicks et al. (2017), find that around one in five of the movers 
from the non-agriculture to agriculture sectors describe the shift as “forced” rather 
than voluntary—for example, when the employer was closed or relocated, or the 
worker’s job was relocated. Those forced to move sectors due to job loss on average 
witness substantial wage loss.
The underlying problem is that in an observational study, one never really 
knows what motivates a worker to migrate or not. Once one is “assigned” to migrate 
using some controlled (or at least well understood) external incentive to migrate, 
some of the inferences may become clearer. For this reason, many researchers 
have turned to experimental and quasi-experimental approaches to measuring the 
returns to internal migration. 
Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Returns to Migration
The ideal experiment would be to induce some rural farmers in a developing 
country to permanently move to urban areas and to observe them and their non-
migrant counterparts (plus all of their offspring, while we are at it) for the rest 
of their lives. But most people aren’t likely to move permanently away from their 
homes in exchange for a modest payment from some experimenting economist. 
Temporary moves may prove somewhat more feasible to induce, particularly during 
times when opportunities at home are poor. 
In a first-of-its-kind experiment, Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2014) 
tried—quite successfully as it turns out—to induce rural Bangladeshi households to 
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send migrants to more productive places during the so-called “lean season” between 
the rice planting and harvest. In the Rangpur region of northern Bangladesh, the 
lean season brings on a large fall of perhaps one-half in average income, rendering 
many households so poor as to skip meals. Around one-third of households were 
already sending out a migrant during the lean season at the time of the experiment, 
with many going to the urban centers of Chittagong or Dhaka to work as rickshaw 
drivers, day laborers on construction sites, or some other low-skilled job. Bryan, 
Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2014)offered households in a randomly selected set of 
villages an incentive of $11.50 (equal to a few weeks wages) conditional on sending a 
migrant in the lean season. This modest sum induced a 22 percentage point increase 
in migration, raising the fraction of households with a migrant from one-third to 
above one-half. The households with an additional migrant saw consumption rise 
by a surprising 30 percent per household member. Those in treatment villages were 
more likely to migrate even three years after the experiment, though only somewhat 
more than households in the control villages.
A follow-up experiment by Akram, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2018), carried 
out in the same region of Bangladesh, offered a richer set of migration incentives 
and more comprehensive household surveys. The simplest migration incentives, 
which were about the same size as those in the original experiment, induced a 
similarly large number of households to send a migrant. The migrants and their 
families were contacted (pestered, one might say) every week during the lean 
season with specific questions about the migrants’ employment, earnings, and 
the remittances sent back to their relatives in the villages. In a second treatment 
arm, a larger fraction of households was offered the incentive in some villages, 
and this randomly selected second group of villages sent even more migrants. The 
two treatment arms allow Akram, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2018) to estimate 
that rural wages rise by 2 percent for every 10 percent increase in the rural out-
migration rate as rural workers become scarcer. In both treatment arms, income 
and consumption were substantially higher in the treatment villages than in the 
controls.
Since permanent migration is harder to induce, it is useful to study episodes 
of forced migration in which individuals in a given area were induced to move out 
of rural agricultural areas by some strong external force. Perhaps the most relevant 
study for our discussion is by Sarvimäki, Uusitalo, and Jäntti (2019) who analyze 
the long-term consequences of when Finland ceded a large portion of its eastern 
region to the Soviet Union after World War II and had to resettle 430,000 people 
(11 percent of its population). While Finland is a rich country by any metric today, 
its GDP per capita was under $5,000 in 1950 (in purchasing power parity terms), 
and the workforce was mostly agricultural like most developing nations today. A 
quarter century later in 1971, the groups that were resettled consistently had higher 
income than comparison groups (like those just on the other side of the border) 
who had not resettled. The main reason was that being forced to move increased 
the changes of leaving farming and joining the non-agricultural sector—with its 
higher wages—by about 50 percent. Interestingly, the children of resettled farmers 
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also have higher incomes and education than the children of farmers not resettled, 
pointing to important intergenerational effects of migration.3
While all of the evidence presented in this section is specialized in some way, it 
reinforces the message that the urban-rural gap cannot be solely about sorting. After 
all, if the rural-urban gap were all about efficient sorting of better workers into urban 
areas, then an external force inducing people to migrate out of rural agricultural 
areas should not lead their wages to rise. However, the reasons why these workers were 
not migrating more often to begin with—and what accounts for the rest of the gap—
are not settled. In the next sections, I offer my perspective on two broad classes of 
possible explanations: compensating differentials of rural life and migration frictions 
of various sorts. I argue that the latter is the more promising explanation of the two.
Non-Monetary Amenities of Rural Areas
One can easily imagine that the higher wages of developing world cities reflect 
a premium for lower non-monetary amenities than in rural areas. In fact, this was 
almost certainly the case in the “killer cities” of the past, which had much higher 
death rates than the rural hinterlands (Costa and Kahn 2006; Hanlon and Tian 
2015; Jedwab and Vollrath 2016). More generally, other non-monetary amenities 
of rural life may represent the compensating differentials that underly the “spatial 
equilibrium” assumption common in urban economics in which households are 
indifferent on average between locations with high wages and fewer amenities and 
those with lower wages but more amenities (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009). 
In an attempt to shed light on this hypothesis, Gollin, Kirchberger, and Lagakos 
(2019) analyze spatial data for 20 African countries covering a select number of 
non-monetary “amenities” related to public goods, pollution, and crime. Theirs 
is hardly an exhaustive list of all possible amenities but rather, some of the candi-
dates most commonly discussed. They find that public goods are generally much 
less common in rural areas, including electricity, piped water, and sewage systems 
(as highlighted in the Nigeria and India comparisons at the start of this article). 
Indoor air pollution is clearly worse in rural areas because rural households burn 
solid fuels such as wood for their cooking, which creates a lot of smoke. The World 
Health Organization (2014) estimates that around four million people die prema-
turely each year due to burning solid fuels indoors. Perhaps surprisingly, outdoor 
air pollution is somewhat worse on average in rural areas in Africa. The rural areas 
in this study tend to be closer to the Sahara Desert where fine particulate matter 
3 In a related study, Nakamura, Sigurdsson, and Steinsson (2019) study the after-effects of a volcanic 
eruption on a rural fishing community in Iceland which destroyed a random selection of houses. Those 
under 25 at the time of the eruption who migrated had earnings 83 percent higher than those that stayed 
behind, some of which happened because the movers completed 3.5 more years of schooling. Bazzi et 
al. (2016) study an episode of forced migration across islands in Indonesia, in which rural farmers were 
moved from denser to less dense islands. The overall wage gains were not that large, suggesting that 
moving workers within the agricultural sector may not be a fruitful way to raise overall productivity. 
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in the air is highest, while African cities have low levels of manufacturing activity 
given their level of GDP per capita (Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath 2016). 
Crime is the one area where African cities appear worse on some metrics than 
their hinterlands, but the differences are not dramatic. In rural areas, 10 percent 
of respondents reported that they or a household member were physically attacked 
in the last year; in urban areas, the rate was 12 percent. Rates of theft are modestly 
higher in urban areas. When asked about whether they ever felt unsafe in their 
homes, 37 percent of those in rural areas answered in the affirmative compared to 
45 percent in urban areas. 
Does evidence on nonmonetary amenities from African cities jibe with the situa-
tion in South Asia or other parts of the developing world? More systematic evidence is 
needed here. In the dimension of air pollution, for example, cities in India have some 
of the worst air quality in the world and appear much worse than rural areas. In terms 
of crime patterns, some cities like Bangkok and Manila are thought to have much 
higher crime rates than their rural hinterlands. Yet in Madagascar, Fafchamps and 
Moser (2003) find that rural areas have higher rates of homicide, burglary, and inse-
curity than do urban households. Other non-monetary amenities that have not been 
systematically explored in a developing world context include commuting times and 
sanitation—these could certainly play some role in explaining some of the urban wage 
premium. Yet I am skeptical that, taken as a whole, they will explain all that much. 
Arguably a more promising version of the amenities story is one in which indi-
viduals have idiosyncratic tastes for rural and urban amenities, as in the recent work 
in the urban economics literature (for example, Kline and Moretti 2014). The 
idea is that some rural individuals (“the country mice”) may optimally choose to 
remain there even if moving to the city would result in substantial income gains. For 
example, some rural residents may particularly value living in sparsely populated 
areas or the bucolic way of life. Such a story can help reconcile the persistence of 
urban-rural gaps despite income gains for those induced to migrate. The task of 
separating the idiosyncratic taste shocks from the frictions that hold back migration 
is a worthwhile—and challenging—job for future research.
Frictions: Information, Financial, and Land Markets
Few economists would dispute the notion that markets in developing countries 
are full of frictions. A growing body of evidence suggests that some of these frictions 
may be important factors holding back rural-urban migration and that migration 
frictions more generally lead to substantially lower aggregate productivity (for 
example, Bryan and Morten 2018; Tombe and Zhu 2019).4 
4 Interestingly, one seemingly obvious type of migration friction—poor road networks—seems to have 
rather modest effects on internal migration rates and aggregate productivity. At least, this is the conclu-
sion reached by Asher and Novosad (2020); Banerjee, Duflo and Qian (2020); and Morten and Oliveira 
(2018) in their studies of road building projects in India, China, and Brazil, respectively. 
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For starters, one wonders how much people in rural parts of the developing 
world even know about wages and living conditions in distant cities. If most rural 
residents are not even aware of how much higher wages are in cities, it might 
help to explain why internal migration rates are not higher. Bryan, Chowdhury, 
and Mobarak (2014) put this information-frictions theory to the test in one arm 
of their experimental setting in 16 poor rural villages in northern Bangladesh. 
Certain households were presented with information on the most common jobs 
available for seasonal migrants like rickshaw driver, construction worker, or day 
laborer in four common destinations along with likelihood of finding one of these 
jobs and average wages. As it turns out, this information treatment had a precise 
zero effect on migration. In this setting—and remember, around one-third of 
households were already sending seasonal migrations from this region—it seems 
natural to assume that households already had sound information about job pros-
pects for seasonal migrants.
However, in a study about migration expectations among rural Kenyans, 
Baseler (2019) reaches virtually the opposite conclusion. Even though unedu-
cated Kenyans earn twice as much as their rural counterparts, rural workers 
substantially underestimate the magnitude of this wage gap. To understand 
why, Baseler (2019) runs an information experiment on a set of villagers where 
he informs them of the average wages and prices of food in Nairobi and other 
urban centers, plus the most common jobs for migrants in each potential desti-
nation. This simple intervention raises expectations about average urban wages 
and increases migration to Nairobi, from 20 percent of rural households to 
28 percent. Two years later, migration rates were still higher among those getting 
the information treatment, and migrants reported higher subjective well-being on 
average. 
So why are these Kenyans so poorly informed to begin with? Baseler (2019)
theorizes that migrants tend to underreport their earnings in cities to their rural 
brethren so as not to have to send back too much of their income as remittances. To 
test his theory, Baseler (2019) runs a second experiment where he spills the beans 
about all the hidden savings by families with migrants to a random set of others in 
the villages. This information treatment group responds by updating their expecta-
tions about urban wages and their plans to send more migrants in the future. The 
lesson is that even if out-migration is common in rural areas, the locals still may 
have imperfect information about wages in the cities. The extent to which informa-
tion frictions hold back migration in other settings is certainly a topic worth more 
exploration, especially given how cheap it is to provide information about urban 
wages and job prospects relative to, say, the cost of providing an additional year of 
formal education.
Financial frictions of various sorts have long been thought to be important 
barriers to migration. In particular, financial frictions might bite if migration 
to cities is a risky enterprise, as emphasized in the classic paper by Harris and 
Todaro (1970), and potential migrants face borrowing constraints. Bryan et al. 
(2014) interpret the outcomes of their migration experiments (discussed earlier) 
188     Journal of Economic Perspectives
as being about migration risk and borrowing constraints, which keep productive 
rural people from moving while they do not have a sufficiently large buffer stock 
of savings to self-insure.
But on further inspection, the explanation that migration risk and credit 
constraints are what held back migration in this setting doesn’t seem quite right.5 
Lagakos, Mobarak, and Waugh (2019) reinterpret the experimental evidence of 
Bryan et al. (2014) and argue that the experimental data are more consistent with 
a model in which rural households generally prefer to be in rural areas and only 
migrate to cities when they are desperate enough to make it worth their while. In 
the data, it is the households with lower assets and consumption levels that are more 
likely to seasonally migrate, rather than the other way around. Also, when offered 
cash that is not tied to migration, few households actually decide to migrate in 
response. Kleemans (2015) finds a similar result in Indonesia, where rural house-
holds—particularly those with low asset levels—send more temporary migrants in 
response to negative rainfall shocks. Lagakos, Mobarak, and Waugh (2019) use their 
model to simulate the effects of permanently offering migration subsidies and show 
that the welfare effects from such a policy come largely through offering better 
insurance to vulnerable rural households. 
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) and Morten (2019) make the case that a related 
type of financial friction—the lack of insurance markets—is a constraint on migra-
tion that holds down average productivity levels. The idea is that many people are 
stuck in rural villages because they lack formal insurance, including public safety-
net programs, and thus rely on the informal risk-sharing arrangements prevalent in 
rural communities (Townsend 1994; Udry 1994). In support of this theory, Munshi 
and Rosenzweig (2016) show that in a set of Indian villages, those that have riskier 
incomes are less likely to have migrant members. Counterfactual simulations from 
their model predict that improving insurance markets would lead to substantial 
reductions in the misallocation of rural workers, many of whom are currently stuck 
inefficiently in rural areas.
Frictions in land markets in poor countries also may be an important factor 
holding back rural-urban migration and income levels for many rural households. 
Unlike in the United States, where real estate is bought and sold readily just about 
anywhere, few Africans or South Asians hold a title to their land that could allow 
them to sell it, even in principle. To be sure, land-titling programs are growing, 
but traditional systems of land rights are still the norm, and markets for land are 
still nonexistent in most rural areas. In the context of internal migration, the lack 
of land markets, along with financial frictions discussed above, suggest that it will 
5 Though financial constraints certainly may play an important role in holding back internal migration 
in other settings, as Cai (2020) shows for China. He randomizes the rollout of a microfinance program 
in rural Chinese villages and shows that those getting micro-finance loans are much more likely to send 
migrants seasonally to nearby cities. Migrants experienced increases in earnings of around 36 percent 
relative to the mean of the control group. Angelucci (2015) and Bazzi (2017) provide evidence that 
financial constraints hold back international migration among very poor households in Mexico and 
Indonesia, respectively.
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be hard for villagers to save up to fund a migration episode, which requires liquid 
wealth. In addition, those without formal title may be unlikely to migrate for fear of 
losing their land.
Land market frictions can be potent in holding back migration. A study by de 
Janvry, Emerick, Gonzalez-Navarro, and Sadoulet (2015) analyzes the rollout of a 
new land-titling system in Mexico that began in the 1990s, which gave official owner-
ship of land to rural households that had previously farmed the land informally. 
The authors find that those receiving a title over their land were 28 percent more 
likely to send migrants. Their interpretation is that the insecurity over land owner-
ship, rather the lack of liquidity, was the main reason migration was not higher 
before the titling program. In related studies, Chen (2017) and Gottlieb and Grob-
ovsek (2019) argue that land frictions like these, which keep too many workers in 
agriculture, lead to substantial misallocation of talent. Using a model of structural 
change calibrated to Ethiopia, Gottlieb and Grobovsek (2018) simulate the effects 
of improving markets for land and find that it would raise aggregate productivity by 
9 percent, as previously misallocated agriculture workers move into more produc-
tive non-agricultural activities. Chen (2017) finds an even larger effect in Malawi, 
which had virtually none of its land titled as recently as 2007.
There are certainly other frictions that hold back migration within developing 
countries, and research on this important topic is still in its infancy in many ways. 
Future work should thus continue to help identify and measure the frictions holding 
back migration of rural workers into more productive opportunities in cities. More 
analyses that help quantify their importance of specific barriers to migration for 
development outcomes, like aggregate productivity, would also be most valuable. 
■ For helpful comments on this essay, I thank the JEP editors: Gordon Hanson, Enrico 
Moretti, Heidi Williams, and especially Timothy Taylor, plus Doug Gollin, Jim Rauch, and 
Todd Schoellman.
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